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ST 
Design conservatism is the difference be- 
tween specified and required performance, 
and is introduced when uncertainty is pres- 
ent. The classical approach of worst-case 
analysis for specifjling design conservatism is 
presented, along with the modem approach 
of probabilistic analysis. The appropriate de- 
gree of design conservatism is a tradeoff 
between the required resources and the 
probability and consequences of a failure. A 
probabilistic analysis properly models this 
tradeoff, while a worst-case analysis reveals 
nothing about the probability of failure, and 
can significantly overstate the consequences 
of failure. Two aerospace examples will be 
presented that illustrate problems that can 
arise with a worst-case analysis. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Design conservatism is the difference be- 
tween specified and required performance, 
and is introduced when uncertainty is pre- 
sent. It can appear in several forms--as a 
margin added to the performance require- 
ments, or as an overstatement in the asso- 
ciated risk of failure, either in the conse- 
quences or the probability of failure. In any 
form, it forces more resources into some as- 
pect of the design. 
In practice, design conservatism is specified 
and implemented by a wide range of people, 
from top managers to technicians. In protect- 
ing against failures, the designer must ask: 
0 What can go wrong? 
e How likely is it? 
0 What are the consequences? 
e What can be done to reduce the likeli- 
e What can be done to mitigate the conse- 
hood? 
quences? 
It is out of this questioning process that 
candidates for design conservatism arise. 
Where the consequences of a power outage 
are severe, facilities supply their own backup 
power. Uncertainty exists as to how long the 
power would be out, and how much power 
would be needed during this period. The de- 
sign conservatism would be the overcapacity 
added to the backup power source. 
An out-of-control nuclear power plant can 
go super-critical with a subsequent catas- 
trophic emission of radioactive material. 
While this has not happened in the U.S., 
nevertheless Chernobyl makes this a credible 
scenario. The consequences are sickness, 
loss of life, and the environmental damage 
and cleanup costs. Conservatism could be 
implemented by overstating the likelihood of 
an accident and the severity of the conse- 
quences, and designing to meet environ- 
mental requirements consistent with the 
overstated risk. 
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2. 
analysis for a design is a t 
solve uncert~nt~es, a 
one way to implement design conservatism. 
A design margin is added to bring the mini- 
mum performance level of the design up to 
the maximum performance level that could 
be required. An additional design margin 
may be added to account for unknown 
effects not included in the worst-case esti- 
mates. In principle, worst-case analyses ne- 
gate any requirement to consider uncertainty. 
A worst-case analysis for specifling a design 
may be appropriate if the following condi- 
tions can be met: 
(1) The worst-case scenario for the analy- 
sis is truly a worst case. 
(2) The adverse consequence associated 
with the worst-case scenario is accept- 
able. 
(3) The design consistent with the worst- 
case analysis is feasible. 
For example, if it were not possible for a bird 
weighing more than 12 pounds to impact an 
aircraft windshield at more than 600 miles 
per hour, then a design that could be guaran- 
teed to survive this impact would be con- 
sistent with a worst-case analysis. If it were 
merely improbable that the bird would weigh 
more, or improbable that the plane would be 
traveling at a higher speed, then the design 
would not truly correspond to a worst-case 
analysis. 
With respect to Condition (l), stating that it 
is not credible that the bird would weigh 
more, or that it is not credible that the plane 
would be traveling at a higher speed, is not 
sufficient. The touted virtue of a worst-case 
analysis is that you don't have to specie the 
uncertainty. A statement that a scenario is 
case analysis must be acceptable because the 
with the 
not be- 
of occurrence is ac- 
ceptably small. 
What's wrong with designs consistent with 
worst-case analyses? Nothing, if you can 
satis@ Conditions (1) and (2), retain feasibil- 
ity, and spare the additional resources. But 
this rarely happens in practice. What often is 
claimed to be a design consistent with a 
worst-case analysis is more often a design by 
fiat--the design will perform under stated 
conditions which may or may not be ex- 
ceeded--or is a design consistent with an 
analysis for all credible conditions masking 
as a worst-case analysis. For example, worst- 
case analyses for electronic equipment 
assume that the environment and the power 
source will be within specification. 
Worst-case analyses are most appropriate at 
the lowest level of systems, such as specifi- 
cations for electronic parts and circuits, 
where a detailed analysis of the environment 
for each individual part would be impractical 
and unnecessary (Ref 1). At higher levels in 
a system, designs consistent with worst-case 
analyses impact limited resources. 
All designs exist in a resource-constrained 
environment. Thus, exceeding the require- 
ments of one aspect of the design inevitably 
comes at the expense of something else. The 
increase in the strength of a structural el- 
ement comes at the expense of weight--thus 
reducing payload. A triply-redundant design 
costs more than simple redundancy. 
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3. 
ou must be able 
tainty and subsequently apply conservatism 
to a probabilistic design, you must be able to 
measure the risk--probability and conse- 
quences--associated with the uncertainty. 
While there are undeniable problems with 
measuring consequences, the greatest con- 
troversy arises in the measurement of prob- 
ability. 
Can probabilities be measured--or do they 
even exist--for events where the probability 
of occurrence is so low that few if any events 
have ever been observed? The answer to this 
question comes fkom theories of probability. 
There is little disagreement on how to use 
probabilities once they have been assigned. 
Nearly all analyses claiming to be probabilis- 
tic use the three Kolmogorov axioms (Ref 
3): (1) Probabilities are numbers equal to or 
greater than 0, (2) the probability of the uni- 
versal event (sure thing--something happens) 
is 1, and (3) probabilities of mutually exclu- 
sive events add. 
Simple arguments justi@ using Kolmogorov 
axioms for the long-run ratio of successes to 
trials, and probability is defined this way in 
many probability texts (Ref 4). This ratio 
lies between 0 and 1, and these ratios add for 
mutually exclusive events. 
Where few or no events have been observed, 
probabilities must be based on degrees of be- 
lief One might believe based on some evi- 
dence that the probability of rain today is 
213. Consistency with the Kolrnogorov ax- 
ioms, for example, requires that the probabil- 
ity of no-rain be 1/3. The most commonly 
used justification for the use of the 
Kolmogorov axioms for degrees of belief 
olmogorov axioms with respect to your 
bets against you such that you will always 
lose, independent of the outcome of the 
event. Contrariwise, if you are consistent 
with the Kolmogorov axioms, such a series 
of bets is not possible. 
4. PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS 
Apostolakis, in his Science article, "The 
Concept of Probability in Safety Assessments 
of Technological Systems," lists four steps to 
doing a probabilistic analysis for a system 
design (Ref 8): 
(1) Structure the problem. 
(2) Quanti@ uncertainties. 
(3) Quanti@ preferences. 
(4) Choose among alternatives. 
A probabilistic analysis proceeds by con- 
structing a mathematical model representing 
the alternatives, the uncertain parameters, 
the consequences, and their interrelation- 
ships, and a model representing preferences 
for consequence attributes. Uncertainties are 
represented by random variables with asso- 
ciated probability distributions assessed by 
technical experts. 
Preferences for attributes of the conse- 
quences are quantified by means of a value 
function, and it is in the value function that 
preferences for conservatism in the design 
should be expressed, e.g., the probability 
shall be less than one in a million that the 
design fils, or that one attribute of the con- 
sequences exceeds a stated amount. Finally, 
the alternative is chosen that maximizes the 
value. 
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The product of a probabilistic analysis should 
include a statement of the central tendencies 
and spreads of the uncertain quantities. The 
central tendencies may be expressed as 
means or modes, and the spreads as standard 
deviations or fractile ranges. Even more de- 
sirable would be complete probability distri- 
butions, which can be derived from analysis 
or from Monte Carlo simulations. 
The analysis should include all uncertainties, 
not just those easily measurable. It should in- 
corporate, in order of increasing difficulty: 
(1) Uncertainties in the model parameters. 
(2) Uncertainties in the model selection. 
(3) Uncertainties in the decision process. 
Unfortunately, too oRen design analyses are 
called "probabilistic" when only the uncer- 
tainties in the parameters of the model are 
addressed. Rarely are uncertainties in the 
model selection treated probabilistically, and 
almost never uncertainties in the decision 
process. 
5 .  APOLLO RELIABILITY 
ASSESSMENT 
President Kennedy's pronounced goal of 
getting a man to the moon and returning him 
safely before the end of the decade of the 
sixty's initiated the Apollo Project. At times 
the goal seemed unattainable. Problems and 
uncertainties abounded--solar-particle radia- 
esser-known problem involved assessing 
reliability of the 
eller, the NASA 
ed Space Flight during this period, 
says that an attempt was made to estimate 
the probability of mission success using bot- 
tom-up, piece-part failure rates and single- 
point-failure analyses (Ref 15). When the 
original estimates for all the subsystems were 
combined, the probability of a successfbl lu- 
nar landing was about 5% (Ref 16). Mueller 
ordered that a top-down estimate be made by 
looking at the success probability of each 
major event. The revised number came out 
to be 90% for the mission and 99% for get- 
ting the crew back, a success probability ac- 
ceptably high. 
The subsequent success rate for crews 
launched and safely returned has shown that 
the extreme pessimism of the bottom-up 
analysis was unwarranted. Whether this pes- 
simism was the result of conservative es- 
timates or true beliefs can't be known. Given 
the limited experience with space vehicles at 
that time, it seems reasonable that the engi- 
neers produced overly-conservative numbers 
to cover the uncertainties. As the senior 
manager, Mueller recognized the implica- 
tions to the project if it really were true that 
the missions were likely to fail. Here conser- 
vatism as applied by the engineers didn't just 
yield a suboptimal design, it rendered the 
project infeasible. 
This incident has had a lasting effect to this 
day on how NASA views numerical esti- 
mates of reliability. Quoting from a recent 
NASA Management Instruction (Ref 17): 
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that when quanti 
hods are used, 
be exercised to ensure that all uncertain- 
ties are properly included i 
and clearly displayed to 
pretation and misuse of the results." 
6. GALEE0 E NCE 
The Galileo spacecraft was launched on 
October 18, 1989 on a 6-year flight to 
Jupiter, where it will release a probe into its 
atmosphere, and then go into orbit around 
the planet. As Jupiter is too far from the Sun 
for solar panels to be effective, plutonium- 
fbeled radioisotope thermoelectric genera- 
tors provide spacecraft power. 
The National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) and Presidential DirectivelNational 
Security Council PD/NSC-25 require that all 
launches with nuclear payloads undergo an 
extensive environmental impact analysis and 
review process. NASA, as the implementing 
agency, produced an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) and the Department of 
Energy (DOE) issued a Safety Analysis 
Report (SAR). The Interagency Nuclear 
Safety Review Panel (INSRP), an indepen- 
dent review group, produced a Safety Eval- 
uation Report (SER). 
The conclusions of these reports differed in 
some respects. These differences were used 
in support of a motion for preliminary in- 
junction against the launch of Galileo by liti- 
gating parties (Ref 18): 
"The SER's risk assessments are far more 
pessimistic than those in the Final EIS. In 
several instances, risk and radiological 
effects are 10 to 20 times greater than 
those in the Final EIS. . . . When, how- 
ever, the estimates of risk in the SER 
proved to be higher, by magnitudes, than 
in the . . . 
these actions vioilat 
y re- 
jected the . . .  
ourt subsequently denie 
"While the SER is slightly more pessi- 
mistic in its risk analysis, there is no evi- 
dence that the difference is statistically 
significant since both documents indicate 
that the risk is small. . . . The motion for 
a temporary restraining order is denied." 
Were the differences between the SER, the 
EIS, and the SAR due to basic differences in 
engineering judgment, or were they due to 
conservative assumptions? Subsequent to the 
release of the S A R ,  the DOE issued a sup- 
plement to the SAR stating (Ref 20): 
"The source terms (plutonium releases) 
have been analyzed anew but with con- 
servatism removed where it was judged 
to be excessive." 
Similarly, for INSRP's SER (Ref 21): 
(Accident response and source terms 
incorporate) "reasonable conservatism . 
. . where understanding or physical de- 
scriptions were seriously lacking. . . . 
the source terms calculated tend to lean 
towards an upper bound of expecta- 
tion." . . . (The reentry analysis) 9s 
considered conservative. I' 
While DOE'S SAR and INSRp's SER differ, 
it is not possible to know the source of the 
differences. The conservative assumptions of 
both reports masked any differences that may 
have been due to engineering judgment. 
In this and the preceding example, unwar- 
ranted conservatism was present. Further- 
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more, it was introduc 
which is the wro 
servatism in desi 
tism in the analysis. In the words of Zeck- 
hauser and Viscusi, it amounts "to lying to 
ourselves about what we expect" (Ref 22). 
7. CONCLUSION 
Imagine that you are the manager for a sys- 
tem undergoing a design review. One of your 
technical experts says he has done a worst- 
case analysis of a design that protects against 
all contingencies. Ask yourself these ques- 
tions: 
0 Is the analysis truly worst-case? 
a If it a worst-case analysis, can I afford 
the design consistent with the analysis? 
0 If it is not a worst-case analysis, then 
how did the technical expert speci@ the 
most-unfavorable case for the analysis? 
0 What conservatism would I pick for the 
design? 
0 What would be the design if my conser- 
vatism were specified? 
Design conservatism, properly applied, is 
necessary in that it protects against failure. 
This conservatism should appear as a specifi- 
cation for the design, and not a condition on 
the analysis. The degree of conservatism 
should relate to the probability and severity 
of the adverse consequences of a failure and 
should be traded off against the required 
resources. A probabilistic analysis properly 
models this tradeoff, while a worst-case 
analysis reveals nothing about the probability 
of failure, and can significantly overstate the 
consequences of failure. 
8. REFERENCES 
2. Daniel S. Goldin. 5 December 1991. Total 
Quality Management--A Culture Change. 
TQM Lessons Learned. Goddard Space 
Flight Center. 
3. Kolmogorov, A. N. 1956. Foundztions of 
the Theory of Probability. New York: 
Chelsea Publishing Co. Translation of ori- 
ginal 1933 German edition. 
4. Papoulis, Athanasios. 1984. The Meaning 
of Probability. Probability, Random Vmi- 
ables, and Stochastic Processes. New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, I, Second 
Edition. 
5. Earman, John. 1992. Bayes or Bust? A 
Critical Examination of Bayesian Cmir- 
mation Theory. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
The MIT Press. 
6. Kemeny, J. G. 1955. Fair betting and in- 
ductive probabilities. In Journal of Symbolic 
Logic, 20:263-273. 
7. Shimony, A. 1955. Coherence and the 
axiom of confirmation. In Jmrnal of Sym- 
bolic Logic, 20: 1-28. 
8. George Apostolakis. 7 December 1990. 
The Concept of Probability in Safety Assess- 
ments of Technological Systems. In Science, 
250: 1359-1364. 
9. M. Granger Morgan and Max Henrion. 
1990. Human Judgment About and With 
Uncertainty. In Uncertainty: A Guide to 
Dealing with Uncertainty in Quantitative 
Risk and Policy Analysis. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 6. 
708 
1 1 .  U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
September 1984. Probabilistic Risk Assess- 
ment (PM) Reference Document. Final 
Report. NUREG-1050-F. Washington, DC. 
12. Harry F. Martz and Ray A. Waller. 1982. 
Buyesian Reliability Analysis. New York: 
John Wiley. 
13. Miley W. Merkhofer. 1987. Criticisms 
and Limitations of Decision-Aiding Ap- 
proaches. In Decision Science and Social 
Risk Management. Dordrecht, Holland: D. 
Reidel Publishing Company, 3. 
14. George Apostolakis. 1988. Expert 
Judgment in Probabilistic Safety Assessment. 
In Accelerated Life Testing and Experts' 
Opinions in Reliability. Edited by 6 .  A. 
Clarotti and D. V. Lindley. Elsevier Science 
Publishing Company Inc. : 1 16- 13 1 .  
15. George Mueller. 1973. The Apollo 
Mission. In Systems Concepts: Lectures on 
Contemporaty Approaches to Systems. Ed- 
ited by Ralph F. Miles, Jr. New York: John 
Wiley. 
16. Ben Buchbinder. March 19, 1992. "It is 
common knowledge at NASA Headquarters 
that the number was about 5%, but the study 
may never have been documented." 
Washington, D.C. NASA Office of Safety 
and Mission Quality. Phone conversation. A 
subsequent literature search failed to identifl- 
such a study. The number of 50% in Ref 15 
probably was a misquote. 
18. Florida Coalition for Peace and Justice, 
Foundation on Economic Trends, and 
Christic Institute vs. George Herbert Walker 
Bush, et. al. 4 October 1989. Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction. United 
States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, Civil Action No. 89-2682-06, 
13. 
19. Judge Oliver Gasch. 10 October 1989. 
Memorandum Concerning Civil Action No. 
89-2682-06. United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia: 11, 12, and 17. 
20. General Electric Astro-Space Division. 
August 1989. Supplement to the Final Safeiy 
Analysis Report for the Galileo Mission. 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Document No. 
89SDS422 1 : 43. 
21. Interagency Nuclear Safety Review 
Panel. September 1989. Safety Evaluation 
Report for Galileo, Document INSRP 89- 
01, I: VI-19. 
22. Richard J. Zeckhauser and W. Kip 
Viscusi. 4 May 1990. Risk Within Reason. 
Science, 248: 559-564. 
